By Spahic Omer
Makkah with its annual hajj and round-the-year ˜umrah pilgrimages, and Islamic universal unity, brotherhood and cooperation – ideologised in the West as pan-Islamism “ are inseparable, neither at the philosophical nor the practical planes. Muslims exist in order to worship their Creator alone and to live according to the revealed existential paradigm. They are to do so individually and institutionally, and also as free agents and members of the Islamic ummah, which is the inclusive community of believers that is supra-national and supra-ethnic and where taqwa (God-consciousness, piety and virtue) is the only criterion.
There is no Islam without individual and collective engagements subtly woven into processes of developing human capital, society and civilisation taken as a whole. This is the case because Islam is the universal and all-encompassing religion. It is not only faith, but also civilisation. As the ultimate and only truth, Islam integrates the world of spirit and that of matter, as well as the exigencies of this world and the provisos of the hereafter, into comprehensive action programmes and procedures.
Islam introduced a series of measures to build and facilitate the unity and solidarity of its members. From salam (wishing and praying for peace) as the Islamic greeting and salutation, and wishing fellow Muslims what one wishes for himself as a sign of true faith, those measures culminate in the annual hajj pilgrimage in Makkah which is the yearly meeting of Muslims from all over the world, including political leaders, social activists and scholars, and which represents not only the socio-political unity of Muslims, but also the unity of their ontological purpose, mission and direction.
It was no accident, therefore, that when Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) performed his only hajj and when he delivered his historic sermon at Arafat “ customarily called the Prophets last or farewell sermon – he gave special emphasis to the subjects of Islamic unity, camaraderie, equality, justice, freedom and mutual respect. The sermon signified the Prophets seal of approval, so to speak, for Islams and Muslims out-and-out involvements in making the world a better place.
Makkah thus eternally topped the list of Muslim private and official concerns as well as priorities. Ordinary Muslims lived their lives with their minds and hearts fixed on the prestige of the holy city, wishing to visit the place as pilgrims as soon as they could for the experience of a lifetime, while the governments entrusted with the institution of caliphate were duty-bound to maintain and facilitate the situation. Even though the political and economic centres of gravity existed somewhere else, the spiritual, emotional, social and, to some extent, intellectual status of Makkah prevailed and remained unchanged. The validity of the former was largely contingent on the type of relationships with the latter.
People could meet and learn about each others material and immaterial circumstances only in Makkah during its hajj season. If other places kept people apart, Makkah acted as a counterforce. Even if people were uninterested, Makkahs intrinsic heavenly splendour and allure were irresistible, inspiring, spurring and reminding all within its bosom. Positively, while in Makkah, no sincere pilgrim is in full possession of his spiritual and emotional being. No person is completely himself.
Moreover, Makkah was absolutely Islamic and universally Muslim, which means that it exemplified everything that Islam stood for and whatever the Muslim ummah as a body of equal individuals and a federation of homogenous communities consequentiality-wise represented and could strive for. Strictly speaking, Makkah belonged to nobody and nobody could claim control over it. Instead, people belonged to Makkah and were œcontrolled by it. Drawing attention to forbidden differences and kindling divisions within its holy precincts was outrageous. It was also sacrilegious to an extreme degree. As a matter of fact, doing such a thing anywhere was illegal, but in Makkah was exceptionally so.
Historically, there could be no legitimate government-cum-caliphate without a contender being in charge of Makkah and without discharging customary responsibilities towards it. Governments were established for the ideals personified by Makkah, subsisting because of them. Makkah, it follows, was the creator and guarantor of political legitimacies, prompting Muslim rulers to scramble and secure control over, and to œserve, the holy city of Makkah “ and that of Madinah. There was no political gain for a ruler that was comparable to ruling Makkah (that is, the Hijaz region where Makkah was a political midpoint, ahead of Madinah and Jeddah) and to the tradition of his name being endorsed on a weekly basis from the pulpit (minbar) of the citys holy mosque (al-masjid al-haram).
This led to the creation of the title khadim al-haramayn (servant or custodian of the two sacred sanctuaries, Makkah and Madinah) As a small digression, the first Muslim ruler in history known to have used the title khadim al-haramayn was Salahuddin al-Ayyubi (d. 1193), both as a means to attain closeness to God when he was fighting the Crusaders, and as a leader under whom the city of Makkah and its holy mosque were reborn and flourished, to the point that at that juncture pilgrimage to Makkah replaced the caliphate as the central unifying entity in Islam. However, according to some sources of Islamic history, the title khadim al-haramayn as an attribute of caliphs had occasionally been used even prior to the time of Salahuddin al-Ayyubi.
Some of the prominent subsequent sovereigns who took up the same title were the Mamluk Sultan al-Ashraf Abu Nasr Barsbay (d. 1438) and the Ottoman Yavuz Sultan Selim I (d. 1520). The title is still used today by the rulers of Saudi Arabia. At any rate, it seems that the khadim al-haramayn designation was oscillating from being merely honourable and hereditary to being expressive and indicative of tributes for outstanding services rendered to the two holy cities of Makkah and Madinah and their holy mosques, and by extension, to Islam and Muslims at large.
The strength of Makkah was reflective of the strength of Muslim unity, and vice versa. For example, whenever the Muslim world experienced comparative peace, accord and cooperation – willingly or enforcedly “ hajj was jam-packed, effective, safe and secure. The occasion was optimised in every sense of the word. However, whenever conflicts and insecurity prevailed, hajj was downscaled and at times virtually cancelled altogether. According to a report, hajj has been cancelled as many as 40 times in history because of pandemics, political disagreements and conflicts.
On account of this, when the condition of the fast-fading Ottoman Empire (Caliphate) started to prove irreparable in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, the leading voices of Islamic religious and intellectual reforms commenced their calls for the improvement of the functions and the widening of the responsibilities of Makkah as a potential remedy. Some reformers yet mooted the idea of Makkah gradually assuming the role of political leadership, which was to be aided by additionally strengthening the citys intrinsic religious, social and intellectual advantages.
In the midst of the unprecedented predicaments of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, it was indeed only Makkah that had what it takes to become a rallying point for all Muslims. It was only Makkah, furthermore, that could become a catalyst for a potential Islamic regeneration given the circumstances. The most prominent personalities that adopted this course of action were Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi (d. 1902) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935).
As early as 1884, Afghani proposed the idea of establishing an international network of Muslim scholars, activists and mere supporters from all walks of life, with Makkah functioning as a nerve centre and its annual hajj season an opportunity for regular meetings and conferences. He furthermore suggested that mosques and schools across the Muslim world be transformed into centres of teaching, promulgating and facilitating Islamic unity, and that Makkah in its capacity as the personification of Islamic ideals function as the unifying factor and direction (qiblah). Hence, apart from being the spiritual and religious qiblah, Makkah and its holy mosque were envisioned to assume the charge of a unifying emotional, intellectual and communal qiblah as well.
It would be no exaggeration to say that this type of Islamic unity (pan-Islamism) thought, in a sense, contributed to the holding of a pan-Islamic congress in Makkah in 1926, which was hosted by Abdulaziz b. Al Saud “ the founder of Saudi Arabia – shortly after he had captured Makkah and Madinah, and two years after the official abandonment of the Islamic caliphate. This particular congress in Makkah was a precursor to the World Muslim Congress founded in Karachi in 1949, and indirectly to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) founded in Morocco in 1969 with the current headquarters in Jeddah.
Today, the potentials of Makkah are not yet being fully utilised, which is a great loss to Muslims since the prospect of any meaningful Islamic revival will not be possible without the proper functions of Makkah. The intellectual legacies of some of the greatest Muslim minds have not been carried through. Persistent disunity, disputes, sectarianism and bad politics in modern times only go to show how much Muslims have departed from the true teachings of Islam. The status quo also tells how much the latent roles and functions of Makkah are needed. Peoples hearts are still predisposed to “ and pinned on – their only qiblah. The ball is in the court of Muslim leaders.
Needless to say that the pan-Islamic reformist thought at the hands of Muslim leading intellectuals was perceived as a threat to the ongoing Western colonisation and expansionism programs, the focal point of which was the crumbling Muslim world and its civilisation. The calls for Islamic unity and cooperation were relentlessly detested and opposed by the Western colonisation masters as much in the political as in intellectual corridors of power.
Such was the circumstance for the reason that the only formula for the continuation of the colonisation of Muslim territories was that Muslims remain weak, intellectually sterile, globally divided, and regionally at loggerheads with one another mostly over trivial issues. Actualising Islamic unity and solidarity was the antidote to the formula. It was a nightmare scenario for the West. These initial Western responses to the pan-Islamism initiative paved the way for the emergence of what later came to be known in the Western consciousness as Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. They likewise contributed their fair share to the advent of the modern scourge of Islamophobia.
The prospective role of Makkah was also attempted to be manipulated in the process. For instance, it has been reported “ as elaborated by Afghani in one of his articles – that in the latter part of the 19th century Great Britain was concocting a scheme of creating a small caliphate (khilafah saghirah) in Makkah to be headed by the existing Sharif of Makkah, in order to put the Makkah ruler œin control of a powerful means to hold sway over all Muslims (and thereby do away with the threat of the Ottomans). By means of this design, Britain actually wished to assert her domination over the whole Muslim world through her control of the Sharif of Makkah, and in turn, of the holy city, hajj and the caliphate institution. The ruler of Makkah was meant to be a mere puppet.***